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All our statements about the physical world are expressed in terms of everyday notions and thus in terms of
classical physics. This necessity is behind each of our attempt to extract meaning out of empirical data and to
communicate this knowledge to others. As such, it must apply also to the account of measurement arrangements
and to the outcome in quantum experiments. On the other hand, however, if quantum mechanics is universally
valid it should be possible to give a purely quantum mechanical description of objects of increasingly large sizes,
eventually of the measurement devices themselves. It is suggested to resolve this dilemma by using the method
of von Weizsa¨cker’s circular and consistent movement in a reconstruction (Kreisgang) in which it is legitimate to
recover the elements with which one started the reconstruction. The parameters entering the complex amplitudes
of a quantum state have an operational meaning as parameters that specify the configuration of macroscopic
instruments by which the state is prepared and measured. This classical aspect in each quantum description is
at the “beginning” of the Kreisgang. The Kreisgang is “closed” by showing that under the every-day conditions
of coarse-grained measurements a description of macroscopic instruments emerges in terminology of classical
physics and the three-dimensional ordinary space from within quantum theory.
Nach Kant ist das wissende Subjekt eben darum nicht als Substanz zu beschreiben; denn Substanz ist selbst eine
Kategorie, also ein Begriff.
Carl Friedrich von Weizsa¨cker in “Aufbau der Physik”
All our statements about the physical world are statements about the classical measurement apparatus and its classical features.
It does not make any sense to speak about characteristics of the quantum system in itself without explicitly specifying the
measuring apparatus. Bohr put much emphasize in his writings on the fact that the conditions under which an observer can
acquire objective knowledge and communicate it with others requires a classical description of the measuring apparatus, even
then when the phenomena under investigation are very distinct from those of the classical world view. For example, in a
paper [1] of 1949, Bohr stressed that “However far the phenomena transcend the scope of classical physical explanation, the
account of all evidence must be expressed in classical terms. The argument is simply that by the word ’experiment’ we refer
to a situation where we can tell others what we have done and what we have learned and that, therefore, the account of the
experimental arrangement and the result of observation must be expressed in unambiguous language with suitable application
of the terminology of classical physics.” In similar vein, when discussing the Copenhagen view, Grunbaum [2] introduces the
ontology of macrophysicalism according to which ”the existences of the physical world are the macro-object and events of
classical physics. Micro-objects do not exit as such at all but can be introduced into physical theory as a kind of computational
or linguistic link between specifiable experimental arrangements and their observable consequences. Accordingly, to speak of
electrons, for example, as ’interacting’ with measuring devices has, existentially, only a Pickwickian meaning. For only the
registrational processes and components of the classical-describable total experimental arrangements are existents.”
The decisive role played by the classical measurement apparatus in the epistemological framework of quantum physics was
often not accepted or even misunderstood by many scholars. This circumstance was, for example, recently emphasized by
Osnaghi, Freitas and Freire [3], who write: “Bohr’s functional distinction between object-system and measuring instrument was
replaced by the crude physical assumption that macroscopic systems behave classically, which would introduce an artificial split
of the physical world into a quantum microcosms and a classical macrocosms.” The main misunderstanding surrounding the
alleged dichotomy in the Copenhagen view comes from the assertion that a measurement device itself is built up of microscopic
systems, such as atoms or protons and electrons, for which the appropriateness of the quantum mechanical description seems
to be indisputable. In further elaboration of this view, the measurement procedure is considered to be a particular kind of
physical interaction occurring between system (I) and measurement apparatus (II) for which it is possible to set up the quantum
state for the apparatus, the Hamiltonian for the interaction between the system and apparatus, and the Schro¨dinger evolution.
However, from the Copenhagen viewpoint, the quantum state acquires a physical meaning only when it has been related to the
well-specified measurement procedure through which the observables are defined. While there is nothing in the theory that
would prohibit to reach the necessary experimental precision to allow a meaningful state assignment to objects of increasingly
large sizes — eventually as large as our measurement devices — it is indispensable to use classical concepts for describing the
experimental context in which these objects are observed. By appealing to the logical necessity of making a sharp distinction
between object and the measurement apparatus, the device II can only be considered as a part of the composite system I+II
which is to be described by the Schro¨dinger evolution, if it loses its previous status of “measurement apparatus”. In order to
2speak about a quantum state of the composite system I+II, it would actually be necessary to perform a measurement with another
apparatus III by which the conditions leading to the appearance of quantum features of I+II can be established, in the same way
as a meaningful assignment of a quantum state to I was acquired through the measurement procedure defined by apparatus II.
To illustrate the preceding argument take, for example, a spin-1/2 system in the state |z+〉. What we mean with this syntax or
symbol, is that the probability to find the outcome “spin up” when the Stern-Gerlach magnet is oriented along an angle θ with
respect to the +z-direction is p = cos2(θ/2). We see that we never speak about the quantum state per se, but always refer to
some well-defined configuration of macroscopic instruments in the ordinary three-dimensional space by which the conditions
defining the probability for an outcome are established. When considering macroscopic measurement devices – which in order
to fulfill their function necessarily need to consist of a large number of elementary constituents – it may seem natural to assume
that a description of each of its individual constituents and thus of the entire device can be given purely in quantum mechanical
terms. The main difficulty of such a total reduction of the description of the measurement apparatus to the quantum description
of its elementary constituents lies in the obvious fact that quantum states of these constituents can acquire a meaning only in a
classically describable experimental context, thus making the whole argument indefinite in its hierarchical structure. Criticizing
such attempts Rosenfeld [4] notes that: “... no formalization can be complete, but must leave undefined some ’primitive’
concepts and take for granted without further analysis certain relations between these concepts, which are adopted as ’axioms’:
the concrete meaning of these primitive concepts and axioms can only be conveyed in a ’metalanguage’ foreign to the formalism
of the theory.” In a similar fashion Peres [5] writes: “Even if quantum theory is universal, it is not closed. A distinction must
be made between endophysical systems – those which are described by the theory – and exophysical ones, which lie outside the
domain of the theory (for example, the telescopes and photographic plates used by astronomers for verifying the laws of celestial
mechanics). While quantum theory can in principle describe anything, a quantum description cannot include everything. In
every physical situation something must remain unanalyzed.”
Though the measurement procedure is not entirely analyzable by means of quantum mechanical laws, it must be possible,
for the reasons of consistency, to arrive at an explanation of objective properties of macroscopic objects as large as apparatuses
from within quantum theory. In a joint work with Johannes Kofler, I have recently proposed one such approach [6]. While it is
not at variance with decoherence [7], it differs from it conceptually. It focuses on the limits of observability of quantum effects
of macroscopic objects, i.e., on the required precision of our measurement apparatuses such that quantum phenomena can still
be observed. We have considered spin systems and demonstrated that under the restriction of coarse-grained measurements
and the limit of large spins not only macroscopic realism but even the classical Newtonian laws emerge out of the Schro¨dinger
equation and the projection postulate. Classical deterministic laws are therefore an effective and convenient illusion insomuch
one’s observations are of sufficient inaccuracy [8].
When trying to relate quantum and classical aspects of physical description in a hierarchical order, we run into the problem
of infinite regress: On one hand, quantum states require classical instruments to be defined, on the other hand, the instruments
themselves are supposed to be a subject of a quantum-mechanical description. Von Weisza¨cker considered a complete and
hierarchical description of nature to be unattainable. Instead he proposed Kreisgang as a methodological idea of a circular, but
consistent, movement in reconstructing science without a need to introduce hierarchial relation between its basic elements [9].
He writes [9]: “Der Anspruch, damit eine volle Beschreibung der Wirklichkeit zu geben, du¨rfte uneinlo¨sbar sein; legitim ist der
Anspruch, eine in der gebenen Na¨herung [...] konsistente Beschreibung zu geben.” It is important to realize that Kreisgang is
not a circulus vitiosus of some required deductive “proof”, rather it is a consistency argument in which it is legitime and even
necessary to recover the elements of logic with which one started the reconstruction.
When trying to identify which aspects of the classical description should be employed at the “beginning” and recovered at the
“end” of the Kreisgang in the reconstruction of quantum theory, it is instructive to analyze Bohr’s writing [10] from 1958: “In
actual experimental arrangements, the fulfillment of such requirements [describing unambiguously the apparatus and results of
measurement] is secured by the use, as measuring instruments, of rigid bodies sufficiently heavy to allow a completely classical
account of their relative positions and velocities. In this connection, it is also essential to remember that all unambiguous
information concerning atomic objects is derived from the permanent marks – such as a spot on a photographic plate, caused
by the impact of an electron – left on the bodies which define the experimental conditions. Far from involving any special
intricacy, the irreversible amplification effects on which the recording of the presence of atomic objects rests rather remind
us of the essential irreversibility inherent in the very concept of observation. The description of atomic phenomena has in
these respects a perfectly objective character, in the sense that no explicit reference is made to any individual observer and that
therefore [...] no ambiguity is involved in the communication of information.” As noted by Howard [11], Bohr distinguishes
here two classical aspects of measurement apparatus: (i) the occurrence of “irreversible amplification effects” such as a spot on
a photographic plate, a “click” in a photo-detector or the pointer moving in a given position, and (ii) “the use, as measuring
instruments, of rigid bodies sufficiently heavy to allow a completely classical account of their relative positions and velocities.”
Three comments are appropriate at this point. Firstly, as pointed out by Ba¨chtold [12], Bohr never argued that all measurement
outcomes must allow a full classical explanation in which the outcomes are understood as revealing some properties of the world
existing prior to and independent of measurements (i.e. in terms of what we today call hidden variables). On the contrary, he
3repeatedly stressed that in quantum mechanics it is impossible to describe the measurement outcomes by applying simultaneously
mutually complementary notions. Secondly, the investigations in the foundations of quantum mechanics have shown that not the
“size” or “mass” of an object is relevant for the transition to classicality [13],[5,6], but rather the precision of our observations.
Therefore, Bohr’s arguments concerning the necessity of using, “as measuring instruments, rigid bodies sufficiently heavy to
allow a completely classical account of their relative positions and velocities” is correct insofar as it is increasingly demanding
to perform accurate measurements on such bodies. Thirdly, one should leave open the possibility that explicit examples of what
we today perceive as “irreversible amplification effects” might tomorrow be manipulated in a quantum coherent and reversible
way. Clearly, to make an experimental record confirming this coherence one would again need to have some “irreversible
amplification effects”. While, therefore, establishment of measurement documents is a necessary condition to extract meaning
out of the documents whatsoever, the cut between the measurement apparatus and the object under observation can be shifted
and is, perhaps, only conditional on the current status of technological development.
The purpose of this manuscript is to show – on the example of quantum theory of spin – that the classical aspects of observation
can be employed in the reconstruction of quantum theory in a consistent way, thus fulfilling the condition for a Kreisgang. To this
end, I propose the following consistency condition: If in a theory the “state” of a (directional) elementary system (spin) requires
d real parameters to be specified completely, then macroscopic objects and instruments under the restriction of coarse-grained
observations must allow for an “objective” description of both (a) the account of the experimental arrangement and (b) the
experimental outcome in a d + 1-dimensional (ordinary) space. This is for the simple reason that operationally real parameters
specifying the state are the parameters determining the configuration of macroscopic instruments by which measurements on the
state are performed. Note, however, that a priori, the consistency argument does not determine the dimension d. For complex
quantum mechanics d = 2, for quaternionic quantum mechanics [14] d = 5. It is legitimate to think that starting with the
theory that differs from complex quantum theory and going into the limit of coarse-grained measurement one might arrive at the
“classical physics” embedded in a space of dimensions different than the one of our everyday life. It should also be clarified that
the “objective” description in the consistency condition given above is to be understood as a description that is communicable
in an unambiguous manner, that is, independent of any observer, not as a description that allows explanation in terms of hidden
variables.
I now show how the Kreisgang can be achieved in the reconstruction of (complex) quantum theory of spin. Consider a
quantum-mechanical system of a large dimension with a set of 2 j + 1 distinguishable (orthogonal) states |▽〉, |♠〉, ..., |⋆〉. The
chosen notation should indicate that a priori no ordering of the states has been assumed. I suppose that the outcomes of everyday
measurements are in principle directly observable with our sensory organs (e.g. with our eyes) such that the resolution of the
measurements is not sharp, making it impossible to resolve individual states, but bunching together a number of outcomes into
“slots”. It is thus the context of a measurement where the notion of “neighboring” states emerges, by treating those states as
close which correspond to outcomes that are observed close in real space. I therefore choose an arbitrary set of 2 j+1 orthogonal
states from the Hilbert space and impose on them an ordering: |▽〉 ≡ |m = − j〉, |♠〉 ≡ |m = − j + 1〉, ..., |⋆〉 ≡ |m = j〉, which is to
be understood as identifying them with the ordered outcomes in real space. The full justification of this procedure can only be
achieved in the Kreisgang when showing the consistency of the choice of the state ordering.
Consider now a measurement of the eigenvalues m of the observable defined as ˆJz =
∑ j
m=− j m|m〉〈m| in units where ~ = 1.
At this stage of the argument one could think about this as purely mathematical definition of an observable, but bear in mind
that, physically, it represents the z-component of the spin observable. I introduce the spin coherent states |Ω〉 ≡ |ϑ, ϕ〉 =∑m= j
m=− j
(
2 j
j+m
)1/2
cos j+m(ϑ/2) sin j−m(ϑ/2)eimϕ|m〉, with polar ϑ and azimuthal angle ϕ, which are the eigenstates with maximal
eigenvalue of a spin operator ˆJΩ pointing into the direction Ω ≡ (ϑ, ϕ): ˆJΩ |Ω〉 = j |Ω〉. It is known that any spin- j state can
be written in the quasi-diagonal form ρˆ =
!
P(Ω) |Ω〉〈Ω| d2Ω with d2Ω the solid angle element and P(Ω) a normalized and not
necessarily positive real function [15].
As noted above, the resolution of our everyday measurements is not sharp, but bunches together ∆m outcomes of the spin
z-component ˆJz into ”slots” m¯. There are (2 j + 1)/∆m different slots. It was shown [6] that if the measurement coarseness is
much larger than the intrinsic uncertainty of coherent states, i.e. ∆m≫√ j, then the probability for getting the particular slot m¯
can be computed via integration of a positive probability distribution Q as given by
prob(m¯) =
∫
Ωm¯
Q(Ω)dQ. (1)
Here Q = 2 j+14π 〈Ω|ρˆ|Ω〉 is the well-known Q-function in quantum optics [16] and Ωm is the angular section of polar angular
size ∆Θm¯ ∼ ∆m ≫ 1/
√ j whose projection onto the z axis corresponds to the slot m¯. The quantum description of a spin in
a general (mixed) state requires an order of j2 real numbers to be specified. However, the effective description under coarse-
grained measurements is always that of a convex mixture over classical spins embedded in the ordinary three-dimensional space
(i.e. whose orientation requires two polar angles to be defined) independently of the spin size. In this way the Kreisgang is
closed. We began with a description of a spin-1/2 quantum state in terms of two polar angles and we end with a description
4of large systems under coarse-grained measurements in terms of the two polar angles. This is not surprising if one accepts that
parameters in the state |ψ〉 ≡ cos(ϑ/2)e−iϕ/2|z+〉 + sin(ϑ/2)e+iϕ/2|z−〉 of a spin-1/2 system have no other meaning than that of the
angles along which the macroscopic Stern-Gerlach magnet needs to be oriented to observe the definite outcome “spin-up”. We
conclude that the account of the experimental arrangement is given in terms of the three-dimensional space (condition (a)).
Upon a coarse-grained measurement with outcome m¯, the state ρˆ is reduced to ρˆm and will change (this can be seen in the
change of the P-function) if ρˆ contains coherence terms (i.e. non-diagonal elements) across the slots. Nonetheless, it can be
shown [6] that the Q distribution before the measurement is the weighted mixture of the distributions Qm¯ = 2 j+14π 〈Ω|ρˆm¯|Ω〉 of the
possible reduced states, i.e.
Q(Ω) =
∑
m¯
prob(m¯)Q(Ωm¯). (2)
This shows that a coarse-grained measurement can be understood classically as reducing the previous ignorance about prede-
termined properties of the spin system. For example, the Schro¨dinger-cat state |Ψ〉 = (1/√2)(| j+〉 + | j−〉) will change into a
classical mixture ρˆmix = (1/2)(| j+〉〈 j + | + | j−〉〈 j − |) under a (non-selective) coarse-grained measurement (e.g. of ˆJz), but the
two states will be perceived as the very same macroscopic state because the respective Q functions differ only in exponentially
small (in j) amount. Therefore, the set of all coarse-grained measurements is non-invasive [17] on that part of state description
that is relevant for predictions of the coarse-grained measurements, namely for the Q function.
For example, if we remove a single atom from a Stern-Gerlach magnet or flip the state of one of its spins, the quantum state
of the entire magnet will change into an orthogonal one, but at the macroscopic level we perceive it as the very same Stern-
Gerlach magnet. This clearly shows that quantum and classical notions of distinguishability are different. The information
represented by the Q-function can be read out repeatedly and independently by different observers, and it can be copied and
communicated, without disturbing it. As such, it represents the “classical” part of the quantum description. The fact that the
experimental outcome, as represented by a macroscopic property of measuring instrument, can directly be observed by means
of the observer’s sensory organs and will not change under this observation remaining accessible to other observers, enables
inter-subjectivity, i.e. it enables the observers to agree on the meaning of the outcome. This explains why the experimental
outcome can be given certain level of “objectivity” (condition (b)).
As stressed before, the fact that the measurement outcome is experienced as a stable [18] macroscopic property which can
be repeatedly read out by independent observers, thus enquiring a level of “objectivity”, does not imply that these macroscopic
properties of the measurement apparatus can be understood as existing prior to and independent of the choice of the entire
measurement context. For example, in the case of the measurements of different observables with two possible outcomes a1 and
a2, no dynamical equations of classical physics or even of any local realistic theory is able to determine into which of the two
positions x1 or x2 the pointer of the apparatus will evolve from its initial position in all possible measurements, where x1 is the
position corresponding to outcome a1 and x2 is the position corresponding to a2. This is signified by the fact that two separated
parties, performing only coarse-grained local measurements on the subsystems of an entangled quantum system can nonetheless
violate Bell’s inequality [19], demonstrating the conflict with local realism. The important point here is that although for fixed
measurement settings on the two sides of the Bell experiment, the results of local coarse-grained measurements can have a
classical description in terms of the Q-functions, similarly as indicated by Eq. (1), i.e. can have a local hidden-variable model,
the local changes of the settings in the two local laboratories cannot be explained by local transformation of the local variables
in the hidden-variable model.
In conclusion, while it is unavoidable that certain aspects of classical description enter the reconstruction of quantum theory,
this must be performed in a consistent manner – following the requirement of von Weizsa¨ckers circular movement of knowledge
known as Kreisgang. I began the Kreisgang with a quantum-mechanical description of an elementary (spin) system. The
parameters entering the complex amplitudes of the quantum state operationally have the meaning of the parameters that specify
the configuration of macroscopic instruments in the three-dimensional (ordinary) space (for example, the orientation of the
Stern-Gerlach magnet). I closed the Kreisgang by showing that under every-day coarse-grained observations, one arrives at a
description of macroscopic instruments in the terminology of classical physics and three-dimensional ordinary space from within
the quantum description of its elementary quantum constituents.
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